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The tyrant of Syracuse, Agathocles, had made large use of free companies of highland mercenaries from the mainland during his reign. On his death in 288BC the town of Messana (Messina) had fallen into the hands of one of these free companies - the Mamertines (Mamertini 'sons of Mars', after the Sabellian war-god Mamers) from Campania- who made themselves a nuisance to their neighbours on both coasts, and to all who used the Strait of Messina: Greek and Carthaginian alike.
At this time Sicily was divided between three powers.
In 265 Hiero II was elected 'tyrant' of Syracuse, he decided to take some definitive action against the Mamertines and captured the cities of Halaesa and Tyndaris and then besieged Messana. The Mamertines decided to appeal for help initially to Rome and the Roman Senate hesitated to help the mercenaries for a number of reasons, partly because it felt it improper to support what was virtually a robber-state, partly because it feared war with a great sea-power, and because interference would be a breach of the treaty which forbade Roman entry into the Sicilian sphere. Carthage, evidently expecting this, and encouraged by another faction in Messana, sent their required help and effected a reconciliation with Hiero.
Some of the Mamertines thought better of this, and requested Roman assistance against the Carthaginians. They sent an embassy to Rome, requesting help to remove the Carthaginian garrison and basing their request on the fact that they were at least fellow-countrymen. This settled the matter in Rome. Popular clamour and business interests combined to force the senate's hand. Several factors influenced the decision: the Romans had recently gained control of the Italian side of the Straits of Messana by securing Rhegium (Some of the Marmertini's Campanian countrymen, who, being in the Roman service, had mutinied, seized Rhegium (across the Straits of Messina), and held it against the Romans for ten years. The revolt had been suppressed in 270 BC by Rome and dealt with severely), but this gain would have been nullified if the Carthaginians gained control of Messana; if the Carthaginians were left in possession of Messana, they would be able to extend their monopoly of the western Mediterranean to Sicily, and though this would not greatly concern the Romans who had little interest in trade, it would affect their recently gained allies in south Italy, whose interests they had to appear to be protecting. If they neglected them, it was possible that they would go over to the Carthaginian side in order to protect their own trade activities. Both sides wanted this key position - Rome to check the Carthaginian advance and to secure its allies, Carthage to continue the process of expansion and commercial exploitation
The senate itself though was still reluctant to intervene and simply passed the buck to the comitia tributa. The Roman assembly took matters into its own hands and voted not to declare war, but to send an expeditionary force which would try to restore Messana to the Campanian mercenaries. And so began almost by accident the first major war in world history to be waged, not for gold, territory or power, but for principles.
Appius Claudius Caudex, who was instrumental in achieving Roman acceptance of the request of aid from Messana, led the invading army: an advance guard was sent, followed by the main body. Although Rome and Carthage were not at war, there is some evidence that the Romans' crossing of the straits was opposed. The Roman commander forced his troops into the city; he succeeded in seizing the Carthaginian admiral Hanno during a parley and induced him to withdraw (the Carthaginian commander, was subsequently executed for this failure).
The Carthaginians requested Hiero's help in imposing a blockade on Roman-held Messana and together they besieged the town. Both consuls moved south with two legions each (the normal number) and an equal number of allies (all told the force numbered about 40,000). Claudius attacked on two fronts:
Thus by the end of the year, Carthage and Syracuse had been expelled from the neighbourhood of Messana, and Hiero was shut up in Syracuse. There was no triumph for Claudius upon his return to Rome.
In 263 both the new consuls M'. Valerius and M'. Otacilius (plebeian and Samnite) landed with 40,000 men and carried on at Messana. Several Carthaginian towns were taken and M. Valerius marched on Syracuse, threatened the city.
For Hiero, the main issue was now clear, whether Rome or Carthage was to guide the fortunes of Sicily. Hiero saw this clearly, and for the representative of Greek interests there was but one course of action possible. For nearly five hundred years Greek and Phoenician had worked and plotted and fought for this central region of the west. To co-operate with Carthage now, against the new power which had delivered the Greeks of Italy from Etruscan, Samnite and Lucanian, repelled the Gauls and wrecked the designs of Pyrrhus for an empire of Epirus, would be folly. Under Roman protectorate, Syracuse and all western Greeks would be safe. With Greek subsidies, ships and crews Rome could be trusted to win and Roman victory would mean the expulsion of the Phoenicians from Sicily.
Hiero accordingly offered the Romans the possession of Messana and a subsidy of one hundred talents annually for fifteen years if they would guarantee his 'kingship' of Syracuse. It was a small price to pay for security unattainable otherwise. And for the Romans, too, the bargain was a good one. In the event he proved to be a loyal ally for fifty years. A number of other Greek cities in Sicily went over to the Romans and there were Roman victories in eastern Sicily.
Valerius received cognomen "Messalla" for his diplomatic success and was voted a triumph.
In 262 BC, the Romans sent a full scale army to Sicily, commanded by the two consuls Lucius Postumius Megellus and Quintus Mamilius Vitulus, comprising the four consular legions and allied alae in a total of 40,000 men. This was the response to the major recruiting and training being held in the Carthaginian side. Supported by Syracuse, now an official ally of Rome, the consular army marches in June to Agrigentum, in the south-western coast of Sicily. This city was intended to be the base camp for the expected Carthaginian army, but at the time was occupied only by the local garrison, commanded by Hannibal Gisco.
Gisco responded to the threat and barricaded the population of Agrigentum and his garrison within walls, along with all the supplies they could gather from the surroundings. The city was prepared for a long siege and all he had to do was to wait for the Carthaginian reinforcements already being prepared. At the time, siege engineering and the construction of assault devices such as towers was an art foreign to the Romans. The only way at their disposal to conquer a fortified city like Agrigentum was blockade. Thus the army built a wall of entrenchments around the large city and camped outside the city walls, prepared to wait the necessary time for the city to surrender by starvation. With logistical help guaranteed by Syracuse, their own supplies were not a problem.
A few months later, Gisco was beginning to feel the strain of the blockade and appealed for urgent help from Carthage. The Carthaginians gathered a large relief force in Africa, variously stated as numbering from just over 30000 to upwards of nearly 60000 men (the account I read stated 50,000 men, 6,000 cavalry and 60 war elephants) under Hanno 'the Elder'. The reinforcements landed in Heraclea Minoa in the beginning of the winter of 262-261 BC and then marched south to rescue their allies, in the process capturing the Roman troops main supply base and, after a few minor cavalry confrontation won by Hanno, they set camp very close to the Romans. Hanno immediately deployed his troops in battle formation, but the Romans declined the invitation. Instead they fortified themselves on the outer side, building a line of circumvallation. The Agrigentum blockade continued, but now the Romans were themselves besieged.
With Hanno camped outside their own base, the supplies from Syracuse were no longer available. Themselves in the risk of starvation, the consuls chose to offer battle. This time was Hanno's turn to refuse, probably with the intention of defeating the Romans by hunger. Meanwhile, the situation inside Agrigentum after more than six months of siege was close to desperate. Hannibal Gisco, communicating with the outside by smoke signs, sent urgent pleas for relief and Hanno was forced to accept a pitched battle. The details of the actual fighting are, as usual, confusing from the several sources.
Apparently, Hanno deployed the Carthaginian infantry in two lines, with the elephants and reinforcements in the second and the cavalry probably placed in the wings. The Romans battle plan is unknown but their possibly organized in the typical triplex acies formation.
All the sources agree that the fighting was long and that were the Romans who managed to break the Carthaginian front. It seems that Hanno's mercenaries were pushed back on his elephants, which in turn provoked panic in the rear and the reserves fled the battlefield. Zonares has a Roman ambush take the Carthaginians in the rear while a sortie from the garrison was beaten off; Frontinus (in his Strategems, 2.1.4) has the Romans waiting patiently inside their entrenchments while the Carthaginians tired themselves out.
In any case, the Romans routed the enemy and were victorious. Their cavalry managed to attack the Carthaginian camp and capture several elephants. But this was not a complete success. Most of the enemy army fled and Hannibal Gisco, together with the garrison of Agrigentum, also managed to break the Roman line and escape for security while the Romans celebrated their success.
Megellus' forces seem to have been more important in the fighting than Vitulus' (or so we assume in that Frontinus mentions the first, not the latter). As a large part of the Roman forces had to man the entrenchments guarding the city, they were not available to fight the battle. Hannibal could only communicate with Hanno by smoke signals and the like, and could not effectively coordinate his forces with the relief army.
Following this battle, the Romans occupied Agrigentum and sold the whole population into slavery, this was an unfortunate departure from previous practice: the Romans had previously distinguished between Greeks & foreign garrisons and their action aroused more hatred than fear.
The two consuls were victorious, but possibly because of Gisco's escape were not awarded with a triumph on their return.This now meant that Rome controlled most of Sicily and secured the grain harvest for their own use. Moreover, being this the first large scale campaign fought outside Italy, this victory gave the Romans an extra confidence to pursue overseas interests.
The Carthaginians were no longer willing to meet Romans in the field. The Romans now began to attack Greek cities allied with the Carthaginians. When they took a town they sacked it. Carthage now made better progress in Sicily on the basis of anti-Roman sentiment and decided to send in Hamilcar Barca.
Carthage was the great maritime power of the age. The rich Carthaginian overseas trade was able to support huge fleets by the standard of the time. This allowed them to take a virtual monopoly on trade in the western Mediterranean. At that time the Carthaginians boasted that no man could wash his hands in the salt water without their permission.
The Romans, since the earliest times, had not been known as great seafarers. They had not a single decked vessel, and in order to transport their troops across the straits they were obliged to borrow triremes from the Italian-Greeks. During the war the Roman legions met with early successes on the landward parts of Sicily, but at the same time the superior Carthaginian fleets ravaged the coasts of both that island and the Italian peninsula. It soon became apparent that mastery of the seas was of paramount importance if Rome were to progress further.
The Roman Senate now ordered the construction of 120 warships: 100 quinqueremes and 20 triremes that were completed in two months. Polybius says the Romans used a beached Carthaginian ship as a model. The Romans trained the crews on rowing machines during the sixty day period it took to construct the fleet: 30,000 Italian rowers were trained: 300 to a ship (they were supplemented by 120 marines per ship).
In the spring of 260 BC, the Roman fleet had been completed and outfitted, and set off down the coast of Italy toward Sicily. However, they were still no match for the Carthaginians in seafaring skill and initially the Romans were not successful at sea.
Their solution was a new "secret weapon" the corvus, (‘raven’ or ‘crow’ in Latin) which may have been copied from the Athenians at Syracuse. The corvus was a 35 foot long spiked boarding bridge, mounted on a swivel so that it could be turned and dropped on an adjacent enemy vessel. A large spike at the end of the corvus bit into the other ship, locking the two craft together. Then the Roman marines, who were in a larger proportion to the crew than on Carthaginian ships, would storm across and engage the enemy, thus turning a sea battle into a 'land battle' where the deadly Roman infantry skills could be put to use. This effectively converted a sea battle into a land battle.
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In 260, Gaius Cornelius Scipio, that year's senior consul had been chosen to command the fleet. He sailed to Messana with 17 ships in order to prepare for the arrival of the rest of his command.
While Scipio was on the strait, he received a piece of information that assured that the garrison of Lipara on the Lipari islands, about 30 miles north-west of Messana, was willing to defect to the Roman side. Scipio could not resist the temptation of conquering an important city without a fight and sailed to Lipara.
The Carthaginians learned of the Roman presence there from their base in Panormus, and dispatched 20 ships under Boodes to engage Scipio. As the Romans entered the harbour of Lipara with their brand new ships, a part of the Carthaginian fleet, commanded by Hannibal Gisco (the general defeated in Agrigentum) and Boodes, was waiting to ambush them. Boodes lead about 20 ships to block the Romans inside the harbour. Scipio and his men hardly put any resistance. The inexperienced crews panicked and fled and the consul himself was captured. His ingenuity earned him the pejorative cognomen Asina, which means ass in Latin.
The junior consul Duilius, previously in command of the land forces, upon hearing of the capture of Scipio, assumed control of what was left of the Roman fleet.
After this victory, the Carthaginian admiral, Hannibal (not the later one with the elephants), sailed toward Italy with 50 ships, with the intention of observing the Roman fleet. While rounding a cape, the Carthaginian fleet unexpectedly came across the Roman fleet and after a small fracas the Carthaginians broke away. The Romans had found, in the course of these skirmishes, that they lacked the seamanship and necessary skill to outperform the Carthaginians.
The Romans had come up with a new weapon, the corvus, to counter the Carthaginians superior experience and naval skills. The corvus was like a bridge 1.2 m wide and 10.9 m long, with a small parapet on both sides. The engine was used probably in the prow of the ship, where a system of pulleys and a poll allowed the bridge to be raised and lowered. On the other side of the device, underneath the bridge, was a heavy spike, shaped as a bird's beak, hence the name. The spike was designed to crush the planking in the enemy ship's deck, when the corvus was lowered from the Roman side. The system allowed a firm grip between the vessels and the boarding route for the legionaries, effectively allowing the Romans to fight a land battle at sea.
The first major naval engagement of the war occurred in 260 off Mylae (Milazzo), off the north Sicilian coast, west of Messana and south of Lipari. Admiral Hannibal had been plundering the shore near there with 130 ships, hoping to draw the Romans out to battle. He was confident that superior Carthaginian tactics and proficiency in rowing would make for an easy victory. His ships advanced toward the 143 Roman ships under the command of Gaius Duilius.
The corvus proved effective from the beginning and 30 Punic ships, including the flagship, were soon conquered by the Roman soldiers. Hannibal Gisco, the Punic admiral, was forced to escape in extremis in a small boat and boarded another of his vessels. He tried to outmanoeuvre the Romans and attack by astern (safe from the corvi), this proved ineffective and the Romans defeated the more manoeuvrable Carthaginian ships by grappling and boarding, capturing 31 and sinking 14.
In the aftermath of the battle, the first naval success for Rome, Gaius Duilius was revered like an hero. The consul celebrated a Roman triumph featuring the prows of the apprehended Carthaginian ships. Afterwards, these were used to decorate the speakers platform in the Forum, known from that day onwards as the rostra (prows, in Latin. Duilius retired soon from political life, in the height of his career. Hannibal Gisco was crucified for incompetence shortly afterwards.
In 259 Consul L. Cornelius Scipio captures Corsica, but attack on Sardinia fails. but it did not suffice to loosen their grasp on Sicily. Carthage gains in Sicily -- Aquillius left there as proconsul. Another Roman naval victory. Carthage reduced to three strong points all in the extreme west of Sicily, but continues her war strategy. Victory at Thermae.
In 258 C. Sulpicius defeats a Punic fleet off Sulci. Aquillius rolls back the Carthaginians in Sicily.
in 257 BC a third Roman naval victory, off Tyndaris: Carthaginians crucified their commander Hannibal. But Rome had not made any real advance in Sicily and it took 50,000 men to hold what they had. Sardinia abandoned by Rome. C. Atilius Regulus raids Malta and sinks 18 enemy vessels.
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After their continuing naval successes the Romans decided that an invasion of the Carthaginian homeland in Africa was the best way to end the war. Such an operation demanded an enormous amount of ships to transport the legions and their gear to Africa. To complicate the logistical problem, Carthage's fleet was patrolling the coasts of Sicily, forcing the transport to be done in military vessels like triremes and quinqueremes, with little storage space. Therefore Rome built a large fleet, of about 200 ships, to make the crossing of the Mediterranean with safety, and the two consuls of the year, Marcus Atilius Regulus and Lucius Manlius Vulso, were named to command it. But the Carthaginians were not going to let this threat to pass undisturbed and launched an equally sized fleet, commanded by Hanno and Hamilcar, to intercept the Romans.
By this time, Roman naval tactics were already improved. The fleet advanced through the Sicilian coast in full battle formation, with the military ships deployed in three squadrons (see figure). I and II, commanded by the consuls, led the way arrayed in wedge. The bulk of the transport ships was right behind them and the third squadron covered the rear, adding additional protections. The Carthaginians were expecting them and the two fleets met in the southern coast of Sicily, offshore Mount Ecnomus. Carthage initial battle disposition was the traditional long line, with the centre commanded by Hamilcar, and the two flanks, the right one commanded by the Hanno defeated in Agrigentum, slightly advanced.
Facing the foe, the two Roman front squadrons advanced to the Carthaginian centre. Admiral Hamilcar then faked a retreat to allow the creation of a gap between the Roman vanguard and the transport ships that were the main purpose of the military encounter. Following this manoeuvre, both Carthaginian flanks advanced on the column left behind, attacking from the sides to avoid the effect of the corvus boarding mechanism. The transports were forced against the Sicilian coast and the reinforcements forced to enter the battle to face Hanno's attack.
The Carthaginian centre was defeated after a long fight and escaped the battle scene. Then the two front Roman squadrons made a turn to relieve the situation in the rear. Consul Vulso's first squadron pursued the Carthaginian left who was pushing the transports to disaster and Regulus' ships, with the third squadron, launched an attack against Hanno. Without the support of the rest of their fleet, the Carthaginians were heavily defeated. In consequence of the battle, about half of Carthage's fleet were captured or sunk.
Following the battle, the Romans landed in Sicily for repairs and to rest the crews. The prows of the captured Carthaginian ships were sent to Rome to adorn the rostra of the Forum, according to the tradition initiated at Mylae. Not long afterwards, the Roman army landed in Africa and began its punitive expedition against Carthage, to be led by Atilius Regulus.
In 256 Rome broke through and landed an army in Africa. The 20,000 strong Roman army under Marcus Atilius Regulus landed at Aspis near Tunis and established a fortified camp at Clypea (Kélibia in Tunisia) late in the summer and launched a series of devastating raids. As it was now fall and end of the Roman campaigning season the Roman fleet returned to Sicily and one consul and his consular army returned to Rome, leaving behind forty ships and a consular army of 15,000 infantry and 500 cavalry under the consul Marcus Atilius Regulus to continue operations.
The Carthaginians responded by putting together an ad hoc force of about the same size, with substantial cavalry and elephants, and marched to Adys, which the Romans were besieging. The Romans launched a two-pronged attack on the camp, catching the Carthaginians by surprise. A counterattack disorganized one column, but the other column came up and completed the rout. Faced with successive defeats on sea and land, the Carthaginians were now willing to negotiate an end to the war. The terms offered by the Roman consul Regulus were intolerably harsh, namely: give up Sicily and Sardinia, pay an annual tribute and the cost of the war and lose sovereignty and thus they rejected the terms that the Romans demanded.
In the spring of 255 BC Regulus moves to Tunes (Tunis), within a day's march of Carthage, and incites indigenous population to revolt. however the Roman commander refused to enlist Numidian help although the Romans needed cavalry.
The Carthaginians used the winter to form and train a new army under the Spartan mercenary general, Xanthippus. 12,000 infantry, to include a phalanx of Carthaginian citizens, 4000 cavalry and about 100 elephants met near Tunis in 255 B.C. at the Battle of Bagradas.
The Carthaginians formed up with the elephants in a shorter front line and the rest of the forces in the second line, infantry in the center and cavalry on both flanks. The Romans, concerned about the elephants, sent their light infantry forward and deployed the infantry in a deeper formation than normal, but did nothing to offset the 8:1 disparity in cavalry, perhaps believing they could overwhelm the Carthaginian infantry before the cavalry came into play. Allied troops on the Roman left flank were able to attack and rout the opposing infantry not covered by the elephant line, but everywhere else the Romans were severely pressed by the elephants. Meanwhile, the Carthaginian cavalry overwhelmed their counterparts and came in on the Roman flanks. Between the elephants and the cavalry, the Roman army was destroyed, with only the successful troops from the left flank able to escape. 500 were captured with Regulus, 2000-3000 escaped to Aspis, and the rest were killed.
A second great Roman fleet, consisting of over 350 vessels, under M. Aemilius Paullus and Ser. Fulvius Nobilior, reached Africa after defeating the full Carthaginian fleet off Cape Hermaeum (Cape Bon). They withdrew all the remaining troops that were stranded at Aspis. On the way back to Italy the fleet was caught in a gale, and 184 of 264 ships were dashed against the rocks near Camarina in southern Sicily. Lost were probably 25,000 marines and 70,000 rowers (about 15% of Italian manpower) Romans gritted their teeth, raised taxes, built 200 ships, found and trained 80,000 rowers (Rome had fewer than 300,000 citizens).
Polybius calls it the greatest naval disaster known to him.
In 254 Carthage reinforced its garrisons in Sicily and recaptured Agrigentum. Roman fleet is rebuilt to 220 ships. Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio, having recovered his liberty as well as his dignity, is sent to Sicily with 4 legions.
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The war in Sicily dragged on, with the Romans slowly squeezing the Carthaginians into the northwestern part of the island. Their rebuilt fleet helped the army capture the city of Panormus in 254 B.C., but then lost 150 ships in storms whilst returning from raiding North Africa in 253 B.C. More cities were captured over the next few years, while the Carthaginians worked to build up their forces in Sicily. The Romans, wary of elephants after the Battle of Bagradas, avoided pitched battles on clear terrain. In 250 B.C. a Carthaginian army moved out to attack a consular army at Panormus. The Roman commander kept most of his troops in the city, luring the Carthaginians on with a thin line of light infantry. The light infantry retreated into prepared trenches and joined by other troops on the city walls, opened a missile fire on the leading elephants to stampede them and disorganize the Carthaginian troops. The Romans then sallied from the city and hit the enemy flank, routing the Carthaginians with great loss. Though the actual numbers of troops involved in this last pitched battle of the First Punic War is not known, the victory encouraged the Romans to renew the offensive. Yet another rebuilt fleet and armies laid siege to Drepana and Lilybaeum, the latter the major Carthaginian supply base left in Sicily. The Roman fleet once again suffered disaster in 249 B.C. An attempted surprise naval attack on Drepana was discovered by the Carthaginians, who managed to get their fleet to sea and catch the disorganized Romans between them and the shore. The Romans did not appear to be equipped with boarding ramps and the Carthaginians this time had plenty of Marines. Caught in a bad situation, the Romans lost close to 100 ships. Yet another storm destroyed much of the rest of the Roman fleet shortly thereafter. The Carthaginians had regained control of the sea, but did not take advantage of it to influence the course of the war.
The war continued with little change over the next seven years. In 247 B.C. the Carthaginian leader Hamilcar Barca arrived and though he did not have the forces to break the sieges of Drepana and Lilybaeum, held the Romans off for the rest of the war.
In 243 B.C., the Romans decided to build a new fleet of 200 ships, which was used in 242 B.C. to cut off the remaining Punic ports in Sicily from supply. The Carthaginians needed time to put together a fleet to break the blockade, time that was used by the Romans to train their ships to a high level. The Carthaginian fleet was undermanned, not as well trained and loaded down with supplies. The resulting Battle of the Aegates Islands was hard fought, but the Carthaginians were soundly defeated.
With their forces on Sicily isolated and apparently having neither the will nor the resources to build another fleet, the Carthaginians sued for peace. The conditions were harsh and reflected the Roman approach to ending a war as “…the peace terms made it clear that they [the Carthaginians] had been defeated and that Rome was not negotiating with an equal.” (G 128) The Carthaginians lost Sicily and all of the small islands between Sicily and Africa, had to ransom their own prisoners while giving back the Romans for free and had to pay a stiff indemnity over the next ten years. Both sides agreed not to tamper with the other’s allies.
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Palermo falls -- Carthage reduced to minor holdings. The Romans capture the important fortress port of Panormus (Palermo) in northeastern Sicily, but when Carthage moved reinforcements onto the island, the war again came to a standstill.
The Romans failed to press home their advantage in 253, and went on a pointless raid of the African coast east of Carthage. Unsuccessful Roman raid on Tripolis. On the way back they the Roman fleets is caught in another gale at Cape Palinurus (Lucania) and lost 150 ships.
The Senate despaired of the fleet, opted for slow land war.
Carthage at war with Numidia. Hanno the Great II expands territory in North Africa.
In 252 the Romans capture more towns in Sicily, including Lipara and Thermae.
However, in 251 or 250 BC the Romans decided to rebuild their fleet yet again, managing 120 vessels.
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In 250 BC the victory at Panormus was followed by a siege of the chief Punic base at Lilybaeum (Marsala) on the western tip of Sicily - the most important Carthaginian base in Sicily - together with Drepanum (Trapani), by land and sea. The Romans sailed to Sicily with 240 ships loaded with troops.
Lilybaeum was the most important Carthaginian base in Sicily and was extremely strongly fortified with excellent natural defences, and could not be taken by outright assault. The Romans laid siege to it by land, and blockaded the harbour with 200 ships. The Carthaginians sent a relief force of 10,000 men on 50 ships. The admiral in charge of this force, Hannibal (not the one with the elephants), employed an unusual but successful tactic. He moved toward the harbour with sails up. In naval battles, sails were almost always taken down, to improve manoeuvrability and because of the risk of the mast snapping from the impact of ramming. With favourable wind, he was able to sweep right by the Romans, who were afraid to risk the impact caused by such relatively high speeds, and were also limited by their slower ships which would have had some difficulty catching the Carthaginian ships. The Punic garrison inside Lilybaeum was greatly heartened by the successful reinforcement. Later that year, another blockade run was made, again by a Hannibal, this one nicknamed "the Rhodian." His ship was considerably faster than the Romans', and he made several successful trips into and out of the harbour. However, the Romans captured a slower vessel and sunk it in the harbour mouth. With this tactic they were able to capture the Rhodian and his vessel. With the swift ship they had less trouble with blockade running. The siege would drag on for nine more years.
Meanwhile, the main Carthaginian fleet under Adherbal waited at Drepanum, sending out swift ships to again harass the Sicilian and Italian coasts.
In the face of resistance, the Romans were compelled to withdraw. The Carthaginians asked for peace, but the Romans again refused.
In 249 BC, one of the current consuls, Publius Claudius Pulcher, son of the man who had started the war fifteen years earlier, set out with 10,000 fresh men to augment the crews and 123 ships to surprise Adherbal. Claudius was a rash and inexperienced commander.
The Carthaginians had a fleet at Drepanum, twenty- five miles north of Lilybaeum, and Pulcher resolved to attack it before the Carthaginian reinforcements could arrive. The consul planned to take the enemy unawares in the harbour and he succeeded with this part of his strategy. The next part, however, was to sail into the harbour to attack. Claudius Pulcher, who--in the words of Polybius: "owing to his predilections as a drill-master"--positioned himself at the rear of the Roman fleet advancing towards the harbor of Drepana "in order to hustle laggards". Hoping to surprise the Carthaginian fleet there, Pulcher lost all capacity to "lead" his ships with the result that he was unable to react to events as they unfolded. Pulcher's decision was fatal to Roman chances in the battle.
The Carthaginian admiral, Adherbal, sighted the leading Roman ships as they approached the harbor and did the only thing he could. He ordered his fleet out to sea, so that they would not be trapped without being able to maneuver in the narrow spaces of the harbor. The Carthaginian ships made a rush for the open sea, arriving in disorder, but they were saved by the fact that the Romans were in even more confusion. With their admiral a mile behind, and the enemy fleeing from the harbor, what were the leading ships to do now?
The van of the Roman line had been told to enter the harbor. Without any counter orders they did just that, ship following ship until they were as crowded together as the Carthaginians had been. When word reached Pulcher that the van was entering the harbor, he immediately sent a fast ship forward to tell them to come out again. But with the center of the Roman line now pushing their way into the harbor and the van trying to force their way out again there was unutterable confusion, with many ships ramming into each other and snapping off their banks of oars. Roman morale, which had never been high, sank before they even engaged an enemy ship. Pulcher's decision to lead from the rear had created one of history's great log-jams. The battle was lost already.
The Roman captains desperately tried to form up in a battle line. With some ships in the harbor, and all of the others in the shallow waters along the shore, the Carthaginians attacked. As Adherbal bore down on them some Roman ships ran aground, while others could not maneuver because their oars had been destroyed in the earlier confusion. Claudius, meanwhile, was leading the retreat. The Carthaginians caught up with him, and he backed his ships against the shore so as only to fight the Carthaginians from one direction. The results were disastrous. Some 93 Roman galleys were sunk or taken, with 20,000 prisoners. Diodorus, a Greek historian, says that the Adherbal lost only several ships, which originally numbered less than half of the Roman fleet. Only the 27 ships of the rear with Pulcher in command managed to escape.
This was the Romans' most serious naval defeat in the First Punic War.
Remaining Roman fleet shipwrecked near Camarina (the fourth Romans suffered their naval disaster in storms - by then they had lost over 700 vessels). Dictator L. Junius Paullus with 120 warships and 800 transports meets a Punic force of 100. Punic commander Carthalo forces the Roman fleet ashore and anticipating a storm, flees -- entire Roman fleet wrecked in the tempest. Junius marches ashore on Sicily and takes a strategic crossroads.
On his return to Rome, Pulcher was tried for incompetence in Rome and fined heavily. (This was unusual for the Romans, who normally realized that defeats had to be expected. The Carthaginians on the other hand often crucified unsuccessful generals.) The story arose that Pulcher was defeated for impiety. The Romans kept sacred chickens in cages to determine the attitude of the gods: if they ate, the gods favored battle (hence if the chickens were not kept well fed, a favorable omen could usually be gotten). Pulcher's chickens were apparently sea-sick and refused to eat. He is said to have thrown them overboard, saying "If they won't eat, let them drink." The gods were apparently not amused.
In 248 the sieges of Lilybaeum and Drepana continue. The Senate, disgusted with fleet losses due to weather, appoints a dictator, but the consuls are the cautious ones of 252 and nothing is done. In Carthage, conservative forces come to power and emphasize internal peace and prosperity.
Hiero's treaty expired and Rome gave him friendship for all time Hiero spent next 30 years furthering commerce, agriculture, arts. He gave his war machines to Rhodes.
By 247 BC the sieges continued. Hamilcar raided the south Italian coast. Rome abandoned sea ventures. Rome and its allies were exhausted and nearly bankrupt. They did not give up the war, but it was several years before the Romans could return to the attack.
The losses from the numerous Roman naval defeats were staggering. The Roman census of 247 indicated that the male population of Rome had declined by 17% since the start of the war (in peacetime would have risen about 20%). Taxes too high already, there was little more money that could be found. Romans were fearful of allied revolt if they recruited more rowers.
Carthage tired too: new party (land holders) in power. One might expect the Carthaginians to take advantage of their domination of the sea. In fact, in one of the most incomprehensible decisions of antiquity, they decided to lay up their fleet and concentrate on seizing control of the North African interior to the southwest of Carthage. It was apparently decided that Carthage could not afford both a fleet and large army and opted for the latter. At the same time, the Carthaginians, who felt no less severely the financial strain of the prolonged struggle, reduced their forces and made no attempt to deliver a counter-attack.
Hamilcar Barca ('lightning') arrived in Sicily in 247 BC and assumed control of the Carthaginian forces. He renewed the attack and led a very effective defence of Carthaginian interests for the remaining years of the war (247-243 BC). Hamilcar Barca defeated all Roman offensives in Sicily but was unable to carry the war into Roman territory, although the Italian coast is raided frequently.
By 244 he is active in guerrilla-type warfare on Mr Eryx on the north western coast of Sicily, near Drepana (modern Trapani). His camp rested between two Roman armies, thus cutting them off from one another. Hamilcar was able to maintain this precarious position for over two years using guerrilla-type warfare. The Romans made no more progress than Hamilcar Barca
Hamilcar Barca defeated all Roman offensives in Sicily but was unable to carry the war into Roman territory.The Carthaginian navy raided the Italian coast frequently, but made no material progress in the war.
His supplies and reinforcements were limited as there was only one, narrow outlet to the sea. In 242, a large Carthaginian fleet of warships and merchant vessels were sent by Carthage to resupply and reinforce Hamilcar's mercenaries on Eyrx.
By the winter of 243/2 the Roman treasury is exhausted. However the Romans had sufficiently recovered from the debacle of 249 to build yet another fleet. The Senate passed a measure taxing themselves, the monies to be repayable in case of victory. 200 war ships are built.
Successful ground and naval assaults are launched against Carthaginian fortresses at Lilybaeum and Drepanum in Sicily.
In 241 the fleet of 200 quinquiremes which was placed in command of Gaius Lutatius Catulus were sent to renew the blockade of Lilybaeum. Th Romans appeared off the coast of Sicily in the summer and the surprised Punic fleet was forced to sail home, allowing the Romans to take the harbor at Drepana (Trapani), where he installed siege-works and blockaded the city, and the roadsteads near Lilybaeum. Meanwhile he drilled in naval manoeuvers every day.
The Carthaginians managed to reactivate their fleet and send a force of 170 ships, loaded their ships with grain and sought to relieve Hamilcar's troops in Eryx. The fleet was out of practice, undermanned and burdened with supplies for the garrison. The commander, Hanno, planned to sneak into Eryx, unload the corn to lighten the ships and take on the mercenary troops of Hamilcar Barca and then seek out the Roman fleet.
This plan failed. Lutatius got word of the arrival, embarked his best troops and sailed to the island of Aegusa (Aegates Islands or Egadi Islands) near Lilybaeum to intercept.
At daybreak he saw that the strong breeze favoured Carthage and that the seas were rough. He was unsure whether to engage but in the end decided that this would be preferable to fighting the same force later after it could be strengthened by Carthage. So upon seeing the enemy at full sail, he put to sea at once, quickly maneuvering his fleet into a single line facing the enemy.
Seeing this, the Carthaginians lowered their masts and closed. The Romans benefited from removal of all heavy equipment from their vessels and their training now paid off whereas the laden Carthaginian galleys were difficult to maneuver and their marines merely raw recruits. The result was that the Carthaginian ships experienced defeat after defeat. Fifty of their galleys were sunk outright and seventy captured. The remainder were saved only by a fortuitous change in wind direction and raised their masts and ran before the wind, which had veered around, and made their way back. The Romans had taken nearly 100,000 prisoners of war and Carthage was forced to sue for peace shortly thereafter.
Thus it was that on March 10, 241BC, the Carthaginian relieving fleet was totally defeated near the Aegates Islands off western Sicily.
Catulus, who had made the decision to attack, shared in the triumph, though a wound had prevented him from taking part in the operations.
The Carthaginians subsequently crucified the naval commander Hanno.
The naval victory at the Aegates Islands, by giving the Romans undisputed command of the sea, rendered certain the ultimate fall of the Punic strongholds in Sicily. The Carthaginians accordingly opened negotations and consented to a peace. Carthaginian home government told Hamilcar to negotiate peace. The last Carthaginian fortresses surrendered.
The Roman victor, the consul C. Lutatius Catulus, settled initial peace terms. The Carthaginians were to evacuate Sicily give up their captives without ransom refrain from attacking Syracuse and her allies pay a 2200-talent indemnity in twenty annual instalments
These terms were not acceptable in Rome. The Carthaginians were further forced to give up the Lipari Islands north of Sicily to Rome to pay an additional 1000 talents immediately and to pay the remaining 2200 talents in ten years. The final treaty also guaranteed the allies of each side from attack by the other prohibited one side from detaching the allies of the other or to raise troops on the territory of the other. The last provision was to prevent Carthaginian access to the manpower of Italy.
This officially ended the First Punic War. The protracted nature of the war and the repeated loss of ships resulted in an enormous loss of life and resources on both sides.
Sicily was divided:
Hiero's territory and Messana which had alliances with Rome
Some other cities were recognized as free and equal amici
The rest of Sicily paid tribute (10%) to Rome, as they had before (to the Carthaginians)
This entailed a radical change in policy and the introduction of a non-Roman idea = Ownership of, rather than partnership with, subject territory.
A large number of citizens in army were now acquainted with Greek culture due to service in Sicily, inlcuding language, customs, literature (especially plays), plastic arts (e.g. murals). There ensued big changes in Roman society and culture.
The centuriate assembly reorganized (details obscure) to be more equitable and less conservative: Thus tribunes did not challenge election of consuls, praetors, censors. The Assembly passed two important laws, but nothing more: Laws concerned distributing the Ager Gallicus and limiting senators' ability to engage in commerce The Senate gained ground. It was a small body, ready to meet, filled with experienced ex-magistrates. Constant administrative tasks and decisions led to greater prestige. Consuls became more and more under orders from senate. Senators were typically conservative, brave and patriotic, relatively unimaginative. The aristocracy was considered worthy of public trust, even if over-cautious or short-sighted.
Still remarkably free of self-interest in state policy, at least so far as one can tell.
The defeat of the Carthage and the return of the mercenary armies from Sicily plunged Carthage into a merciless civil was - the Truceless War.
Rome won the First Punic War after 23 years of conflict and in the end replaced Carthage as the major power in the Mediterranean. In the aftermath of the war, both states were both financially and demographically exhausted. Rome won mostly for its persistence in not granting defeat or accepting anything else than total victory. Moreover, the Republic's capability of attracting private investment into war effort by inciting citizen's patriotism to fund ships and crews was one of the deciding factors of the war, in contrast with the Carthaginian nobility, apparently unwilling to risk their fortune for the common well being.
Casualties Specifics for the number of casualties of each side is always difficult to determine precisely due to bias in the historical sources, normally directed to enhance Rome's value. However, considering that (excluding land warfare casualties):
Rome lost 700 ships (mainly to bad weather) and at least part of their crews Carthage lost 500 ships and at least part of their crews Each ship's crew was of about 100 men
the conclusion is that, although uncertain, the casualties were definitely heavy for both sides. Historian Polybius commented that the war was, at the time, the most destructive in terms of casualties in the history of warfare, including the battles of Alexander the Great, which further enhances this idea. Looking at the data from the Roman census of the 3rd century BC Adrian Goldsworthy noted that during the conflict Rome lost about 50,000 citizens. This excludes auxiliary troops and every other men in the army without citizen status, who would be outside the head count.
Peace terms The peace terms designed by the Romans were particularly heavy for Carthage that was in no position to negotiate. They were:
Carthage evacuates Sicily Carthage is to return their prisoners of war without ransom, while heavily ransom their own Carthage is to refrain from attacking Syracuse and her allies Carthage is to transfer a group of small islands north of Sicily to Rome Carthage is condemned to pay a 2200 talent indemnity in ten annual instalments, plus an additional 1000 talents immediately
Further clauses determined that the allies of each side would not be attacked by the other, attack by either side upon the others allies and the prohibition for both sides from raising troops within the territory of the other. This prevented the Carthaginians access to any Roman mercenary manpower.
Political results In the aftermath of the war, Carthage had virtually no funds, not even for paying the disbanded military armies. This lead to an internal conflict, the mercenary revolt, won after a hard struggle by Hammilcar Barca. But perhaps the most immediate political result of the First Punic War was the downfall of Carthage as a big naval power. Conditions signed in the peace treaty compromised Carthage's economic situation and prevented recovery. The demanded indemnity put another degree of strain in the city's finances and forced Carthage to look in other areas of influence, namely the Hispania colonies, for the money to pay Rome. This lead to an increasing Carthaginian occupation of modern Spain, with increasing aggressiveness, which eventually was the cause of the Second Punic War. An interesting comparison can be established with the politics of Germany following the defeat in World War I which were the ultimate cause of World War II.
As for Rome, the end of the First Punic War marked the onset of the expansion beyond the Italian Peninsula. Sicily became the first Roman province governed by a former praetor, instead of an ally. Sardinia and Corsica were to be added (again at the loss of Carthage) in 238 BC.
the text is from http://www.barca.fsnet.co.uk/punic1-rome-moves-on-messana-264bc.htm which has the following references
References: Diodoros, 23.8 | Polybios, 1.17-19 | Zonares, 8.10 | The First Punic War, J.F.Lazenby
need to review the battles and other details that are in...
http://www.sciencedaily.com/encyclopedia/first_punic_war
http://www.forumromanum.org/history/morey14.html
http://totalwar.wargamer.com/punic_page3.html